Abstract. In 1997, Lo claimed that Quantum Oblivious Transfer (QOT) is impossible. The result implies severe setback for quantum cryptography. However, it is based on a hypothesis. i.e. to prevent Alice from learning Bob's choice in the scheme, the reduced density matrices in Alice's hand for the two cases must be the same. Actually, to prevent Alice from learning his choice, Bob can send the qubits built in different bases, Base0 and Base1, one would let him to get b 0 , the other one would let him to get b 1 . In this paper, we construct a Statistically-Secure Quantum 1-out-of-2 Oblivious Transfer, which bypasses the attack of Lo.
Introduction
Quantum cryptography is one example of applying a deep understanding of quantum physics to create a novel technology of potentially enormous significance. Quantum cryptography currently has two important aspects, both mostly theoretical. The first is quantum key exchange [3, 4] , the second is the effect of quantum computation on cryptanalysis [12] .
Oblivious Transfer (OT) is a key component in many applications of cryptography [7] . OT was first put forward by Rabin [11] . Informally speaking, in an Oblivious Transfer, Alice sends a bit to Bob that he receives half the time, Alice does not find out what happened, Bob knows if he gets the bit or nothing. In 1985, Even, Goldreich and Lempel provided another similar cryptographic tool named 1-out-of-2 oblivious transfer (OT 1 2 ) [5] using any public key cryptography system. In a 1-out-of-2 oblivious transfer, Alice has two bits b 0 , b 1 that she sends to Bob in such a way that he can decide to get either of them at his choice but not both. Alice cannot find out which bit Bob gets.
In 1994, Claude Crépeau provided a quantum 1-out-of-2 oblivious transfer [2] (QOT 1 2 ) based on the transmission of polarized light and the existence of secure quantum bit commitment [1] . He proved that if both of the two parties follow the protocol, then Bob can get the one and only one bit except with a negligible number ε n .
Unfortunately, secure quantum bit commitment was claimed to be impossible by Mayers [10] , and also by Lo and Chau [8] . In 1997, Lo extended the impossibility to one-side two-party quantum computations, so he had the corollary that quantum oblivious transfer is impossible [9] . These results have been widely reported in the scientific press. However, the impossibility of QOT is based on a hypothesis. i.e. to prevent a dishonest Alice from learning anything about Bob's choice, the reduced density matrices in Alice's hand for the two cases must be the same. The condition is too strong. Actually, to prevent Alice from learning Bob's choice, Bob can send the qubits built in different bases Base0 and Base1. If Bob select Base0, he can get b 0 , otherwise, he can get b 1 .
The paper is organized in the following way: In section 2, we give the definitions of Perfect (Weak-Privacy, Statistically-Secure) QOT 1 2 ; In section 3, we construct a Statistically-Secure QOT 1 2 ; Finally, in section 4, we give the conclusion and show some works for further research.
Definitions
We formally describe the definition of Perfect-OT 1 2 in the following. Definition 2.1 (Perfect-OT 1 2 ) Bob has input c ∈ {0, 1}, Alice has input b 0 , b 1 ∈ {0, 1}. A Perfect-OT 1 2 is a two party communication protocol, the following requirements should hold after the interaction.
. The two groups qubits can be look as two bases of 3-qubits (Base0 when c=0, Base1 when c=1). The density matrixes of the two cases satisfy
This is why our scheme is different from Lo's. Bob sends the 3 qubits to Alice. If Bob is honest, he doesn't have any other bits in his hand.
Alice's Strategy
When Alice gets the qubits, she applies σ b 0 b 1 ⊗ σ b 0 b 1 to the 2nd and the 3rd qubits. It is easy to verify:
That is, Alice will applies a phase flip if b 0 = 1 and a bit flip if b 1 = 1. So if Bob's choice c = 0, the qubits become to be one of the following qubits
When Alice measures the third qubit, there are 4 different cases.
1. If Bob's choice c = 0 and the result be |0 , the remnant qubits |ϕ 3 would be one of
2. if Bob's choice c = 0 and the result be |1 , the remnant qubits |ϕ 3 would be one of
3. If Bob's choice c = 1 and the result be |0 , the remnant qubits |ϕ 3 would be one of
4. If Bob's choice c = 1 and the result be |1 , the remnant qubits |ϕ 3 would be one of
When c=0, if Alice measures the second qubit, the remnant qubit would be |0 or |1 , it doesn't have any relation to b 0 or b 1 . To avoid this, Alice is required to apply the Hadamard transformation to the second qubit before the measurement, which map
Alice applies the Hadamard transformation to the first qubit, which maps
Alice measures the first qubit. In the scheme, Alice applies the Hadamard transformation to the 1st and 2nd qubits, measures the 3 qubits together, Bob can get the same result. Alice announces the measurement result to Bob, Bob can get |b c according to the 16 tables in the appendix (by Alice's annunciation). For example, if b 0 = 0, b 1 = 1 and Bob's choice c = 0, Alice's measurement result is |000 , Bob would get b c = 0 according to Table1.
Bob's Attacking Strategy
In the scheme, Bob is required to send 3-qubits |ϕ 1 , the only attacking strategy he can play is to construct a different initial qubits 
Alice applies Hadamard transformation H ⊗ H to the 1st and 2nd qubits in her hand, the qubits become
From |ϕ 3 ,we find that if Alice measures the 3-qubits in her hand. The qubits in Bob's hand is
For example, if Bob sets
and Alice's measurement result is |000 (this would enable Bob to decide the ± should be + or −, but cannot enable him to get b 0 or b 1 ), Bob can decide that the remnant qubits in his hand is
Bob can measure the 2 qubits with the base (
), get both b 0 and b 1 with probability 1. It is same when Alice measure the 3-qubits with other results.
Alice's Defending Strategy
To prevent Bob from learning both b 0 and b 1 , Alice selects a random bit c A ∈ {0, 1}. Let [ ] i to be selection function such that [a 0 , a 1 ] i = a i , i ∈ {0, 1}. Alice applies [I ⊗ I ⊗ I, I ⊗ σ 01 ⊗ σ 11 ] c A to the 3-qubits, i.e. if c A = 0, she applies I ⊗ I ⊗ I to the 3-qubits, otherwise, she applies I ⊗ σ 01 ⊗ σ 11 to the 3-qubits.
The 16 tables in Appendix can be divided into 4 groups {Table1, Table4, Table5, Table8}, {Table2, Table3, Table6, Table7}, {Table9, Table12, Table13, Table16}, {Table10, Table11, Table14, Table15}. In every group, the measurement result and the |b c are identical, i.e. the same measurement result will get the same b c . It is easy to check that
I⊗σ 01 ⊗σ 11
T able2
T able6
T able10
|1 |B 00 +|0 |B 10 √ 2
T able14
|1 |B 00 −|0 |B 10 √ 2
T able15
We ignore the global phase factor −1, as it doesn't have any side effect for an honest Bob. There are two cases 
Weak-Privacy-QOT 1 2
We present the a Weak-Privacy-QOT 1 2 in the following. .
It is easy to check that 
If c = 0 and Alice measures the 3-qubits with Base1, she cannot decide |ϕ 1 is built from Base0 or Base1 with any bias. It is the same when c=1. So, we have From the above discussion, we can conclude that Protocol 3.1 is a Weak-Privacy-QOT 1 2 .
Statistically
2. For i=1 to n Alice and Bob run Weak-Privacy-
Theorem 3.2 The Protocol 3.2 is a statistically secure 1-out-of-2 QOT.
Proof . We check the 3 requirements in the definition. Correctness : By the correctness in the Weak-Privacy-QOT 1 2 , we have
Privacy for Bob : Alice cannot find out c the n Weak-Privacy-QOT 1 2 so that she can not find out c in Protocol 3.2, i.e. 
So, we can have the conclusion that Protocol 3.2 is a Statistically-Secure-QOT 1 2 .
Conclusion and Further Works
The main results of this paper are: Construct two schemes, Weak-Privacy-QOT 1 2 and Statistically-Secure-QOT 1 2 , which bypasses the attack of Lo's [9] . In the end, two of the following points may be interesting for further works:
1. The physical realization of the QOT schemes.
2. The relation between the QOT and the other quantum cryptography scheme. (|0 |B 00 − |1 |B 01 ) , (|0 |B 10 + |1 |B 11 ) , (|0 |B 10 − |1 |B 11 ) , (|0 |B 10 − |1 |B 11 ) (|1 |B 00 + |0 |B 01 ) (|1 |B 10 + |0 |B 11 ) , (|1 |B 10 − |0 |B 11 ) , (|0 |B 00 + |1 |B 10 ) (|0 |B 00 + |1 |B 10 ) (|0 |B 00 − |1 |B 10 )
Measurement Result |000 |001 |010 |011 |100 |101 |110 |111 |b 1 |1 |0 |1 |0 |0 |1 |0 |1 
Measurement Result |000 |001 |010 |011 |100 |101 |110 |111 |b 1 |0 |1 |0 |1 |1 |0 |1 |0 
